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Hutton: Sales--Trust Receipts in Automobile Financing
STUDENT NOTES
SALES-TRUST RECEIPTS IN AUTOMoBLE FINANCING.-The in-

creased use of the trust receipt for financing domestic sales transactions, particularly in the automobile industry, has placed upon
the courts the necessity of making the formal differences between
trust receipts on the one hand, and pledges, conditional sales, and
chattel mortgages on the other,1 recognize the transaction as an exception to the rule of policy underlying the Statute of Elizabeth,"
by which separation of title from possession is held either evidence
of fraud or fraudulent per se; or shall they refuse thus to uphold
a secret lien, by the use of which the chances for deception are as
great as in the case of an unrecorded chattel mortgage, etc?
"The financing agencies defense is that credit today is not
given on the basis of apparent chattel assets, but on a financial
statement, which shows the facts. Further, that this type of
financing has grown so common in the auto line that there, as in
importing, all prospective creditors take account of it. The opposing argument turns partly on the number of insolvencies in that
line: partly on the fact that it is precisely the dealer who is in
financial stress whose financial statement is unreliable, partly on
1 (a) The security of a pledge depends on possession in the party secured,
and when possession is lost the security is lost. Title is assumed to be in someone other than the pledgee. In a trust receipt the pledgee has title and not
possession.
(b) In a conditional sale the vendor cannot retake possession until a default; he is interested in selling goods as a business and in case of a breach
the vendor sues for breach of contract in failing to buy and pay for goods.
Conversely the holder of a trust receipt can retake possession of the goods
at any time from the receiptor; he is not interested in selling goods and if
the loan is not repaid he sues for money loaned.
(e) Historically a mortgage is a security dependent on title as distinguished from a pledge which rests on possession. A chattel mortgage as generally understood means a conveyance of property by a borrower as security
for his own obligation and the policy of the recording acts is directed at the
apparent ownership based on previous and continued possession by such
borrower of property which formerly belonged to him. "The trust receipt
is distinguishable", says Mr. Frederick, "because title does not pass to the
holder of the trust receipt from the receiptor, but rather from the manufacturer-seller". Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security (1922) 22 COL. L. REV.
395, 546. Therefore at the time the financing agency's rights are fixed the
dealer has had neither possession nor title.
2 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571). The statute recites that gifts of land and goods
to defraud creditors are "more commonly used and practiced in these days
than hath been seen or heard of heretofore" and enacts .that such conveyances
shall be void as against creditors whose actions are thereby defeated or delayed. 'How was such fraudulent intent to be proved? The courts adopted
the practice of inferring fraud as a matter of law from certain facts, whether
or'not there was any actual intent to deceive. One characteristic from which
fraud was presumed was separation of title from possession. HoLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLIshI LAw (1924) Vol. 4, 480.
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the relatively simple filing or recording procedure with single
identifiable chattels of value, as contrasted with fungibles losing
their identity in manufacture, which are the typical importing
case."' The present financing agent is often a subsidiary corporation of the seller-manufacturer organized expressly to finance the
sale of the product to dealers and consumers, in which case the
credit is in fact the credit of the manufacturer. Thus relief of
credit strain on the seller is a necessity that often cannot now be
urged to the courts as a reason for upholding trust receipts.
In the typical transaction the financing agency receives the
bill of lading, with sight drafts for ten or twenty per cent attached,
direct from the manufacturer. At about the same time the manufacturer executes and delivers to the financing agency a bill of sale
for the autos. The dealer then pays the sight draft, signs a note
for the remainder of the purchase price, executes a trust receipt,
and receives the bill of lading. The trust receipt is in use in West
Virginia as a method of financing automobile dealers. The effect
of peculiar local law is hereinafter considered.
Upon the delivery of the bill of lading the troubles of the
financing agency may begin. West Virginia has not adopted the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act, by which a dealer in possession of a
negotiable bill of lading may mortgage, pledge, or sell such bill,
or deliver it in payment of, or as security for, an existing obligation, and defeat the financing agency's title as to any transferees
in good faith. Due to the size and geographical location of our
cities, making unnecessary local distributors, shipments of cars involved will usually be interstate shipments, and the Pomerene Act,
based on the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, will apply and protect
innocent purchasers, etc. of the bills. The financing agency will
therefore be vulnerable until the bill of lading is spent; unless a
non-negotiable bill of lading is used, or the dealers power to deal
with the bills is restricted by the endorsement on it by the financing
agent.
The Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,' in effect in West Virginia, places the same power in the hands of a dealer who holds a
negotiable warehouse receipt, if power to warehouse the goods is
express or can be implied.'
Let us assume, however, that the dealer takes the cars to his
show-room and places them on display. The financing agency's
3LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MLTERIALS ON THE LAW oF SALES
4W. VA. REV. CODE (1931)
47, art. 5.

(1930) 764

if.

c.

G. M. A. C. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 25 S. W. (2d) 405 (Ky. 1930).
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title may be defeated by the sale to a buyer who relies on the
dealer's apparent ownership, and pays value without notice, even
though such sale was expressly forbidden by the trust receipt.*
It seems the financing agency's interest may also be defeated
if an attempt is made to protect it by means of a recorded chattel
mortgage. In Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corporation,' a recent Virginia case, the dealer secured a loan from the financing
agency to meet a draft on cars purchased, and in return executed
a note and a chattel mortgage which expressly provided that if
the dealer should attempt to sell, secrete, convert, or remove the
property without the written consent of the financing agency that
the financing agency might immediately take possession of the
property. The mortgage was duly recorded. The dealer placed
the cars in his show-room, later sold one of them for cash to Boice,
who had no actual notice of the mortgage. In an action of detinue
brought by the financing agency the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia held that "property bought for the express purpose of
daily indiscriminate sale to the general public, exposed for such
sale at the place of business of a licensed dealer, and over which
the dealer is permitted to exercise the dominion of owner, cannot
be made the subject of a valid chattel mortgage, regardless of its
size, value, or capacity for identification." The financing agency
is estopped to exercise its power to take possession.
Although the common law rule seems to have been that a
factor could not make a valid pledge his power has been enlarged
by statute in New York and Massachusetts, thereby diminishing
the protection afforded by trust receipts in those jurisdictions.' A
8 Jones v. Commercial Invest. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 Pac. 896 (1924);
Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., 81 Fla. 687, 88 So. 876 (1921); Simons
v. N. E. Finance Corp., 171 N. E. 643 (Mass. 1930).
127 Va. 563, 102 S. E. 591 (1920).
8
1McKINNEY'S CON. LAWS OF N. Y. (1917) Vol. 7, Book 40, § 43; MASS.
GEN. LAws (1921) Ch. 104, §§ 1-6. "Every factor or other agent entrusted
with a bill of lading, warehouse receipt, or possession of any merchandise

for the purpose of sale .... shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof, so

far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with any other
person for sale or disposition . . . . of such merchandise, for any money
advanced or negotiable instrument or other obligation in writing given by such
other person upon the faith thereof". The purpose of the act has been defined as being "to protect persons dealing in good faith with the apparent
owners of property . -.. . and to make certain the general common law rule,

that, where one of two innocent persons must suffer loss, such loss shall
born by him who placed the third person in the position which enabled him
do the act causing the loss."
Dorrance v. Dean, 106 N. Y. 203, 12 N.
433 (1887). See as to effect in trust receipt cases, Frederick, The Trust
ceipt as Seourity (1922) 22 COL. L. Rnv. 546-549 and cases cited.
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similar result would seem to be effected in West Virginia and Virginia by virtue of what are called the Traders Acts,' which provide
that "if any person shall transact business as a trader, with the
addition of the words 'factor,' 'agent,' 'and Company,' or 'and
Co.' and fail to disclose the name of his principal or partner ....
or if any person transact business in his own name, without any
such addition all the property, stock, and choses in action acquired
or used in such business shall, as to the creditors of any such person, be liable for his debts." Our court has held that the placing
of autos in the hands of a dealer, with limited power of sale, comes
within the Act and the levying creditor will be protected. '
In the common law trust receipt transaction it seems clear
there is a power in the dealer, either express or implied, to sell,
for it is out of the dealer's ultimate sale that the debt will be liquidated and he will make his profit. The Uniform Conditional Sales
Act provides that "When goods are delivered under a conditional
sales contract and the seller expressly or impliedly consents that
the buyer may resell them prior to performance of the condition
the reservation of property shall be void as against purchasers,
etc."' Goods put into the retailer's stock with the consent of the
wholesaler are treated as conclusive evidence that they are there
for sale and that the retailer has title or the right to convey."2
Other states have shown a tendency to bring the transaction
within the terms of a recording act, and place the loss on the
financing agency. An Iowa case where the trust receipt authorized
sale if the proceeds were applied to the financing agency's account
holds that although the transaction is in the nature of a conditional sale a purchaser must be without notice of the unrecorded
trust receipt.' A financing agency holding a trust receipt is pro0W.
VA. Rzv. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 7, § 1; VA. CODE AxNr. (1930) §5224.
10Midland Invest. Corp. v. May, 104 W. Va. 289, 140 S. E. 5 (1927).
1 W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 3, § 9. It is interesting to note in
this connection that prior to the adoption of the revised code the section of
the conditional sales act applicable, Acts 1925, c. 64, § 9, differed from the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act in that it provided "When goods are delivered under a conditional sales contract, trust receipt, or reservation of title,
the buyer shall not sell or otherwise dispose of suck goods or chattels without
the expressed permission in writing of the holder of the conditional sales
contract, reservation of title, or trust receipt. trpon securing such permission in writing the buyer may resell such goods or chattels prior to performance," etc. Such variation was omitted by the revisors, and the section is
now identical with the corresponding section of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act.
"EsTscH, INsTALLErNT SALES (1930) 998 and cases cited.
"Ohio Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Schneider, 202 Iowa 938, 211 N.
W. 248 (1926).
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tected against one having actual notice even if the trust receipt is
unrecorded, and held to come within the terms of a recording
statute."'
In California a trust receipt was held to be a conditional sale,
and as unrecorded a transfer by the dealer to a salesman in the
ordinary course of business divested the financing agency's title."
That the proper use of the trust receipt as a reservation of title
by the financing agency is even yet not clearly understood is shown
by a Texas case where the court refused to protect the agency as
the dealer had executed the trust receipt a month after he had received the cars from the manufacturer." In a recent Nebraska
case a dictum of the court holds that a trust receipt is neither a
chattel mortgage, absolute sale, conditional sale, nor lease, and is,
therefore, exempt from recording act provisions"
Clearly the trust receipt transaction is valid between the
parties thereto, but what effect will the dealer's bankruptcy have
on their respective rights? In the recent case of Houck v. G. M.
A. C.' the financing agency, by virtue of a trust receipt retook
seven cars from the dealer within four months of his voluntary
petition in bankruptcy. The court limited the status of the dealer's
trustee in bankruptcy to that of a creditor holding a lien by legal
or equitable process at the time when the petition in bankruptcy
was filed, and not prior thereto, and held the retaking not to
anmount to a preference under the Bankruptcy Act.
Similarly, under the Kansas conditional sales recording act,
which prefers a creditor of the vendee who claims a lien on the
property by legal process prior to recording, a conditional vendor
who had recorded his contract shortly before the filing of the
9
vendee's petition in bankruptcy, was protected."
Since the status
of the trustee as lien creditor dates from the time of filing, it seems
obvious that a recording thereafter would not protect the conditional vendor. Doubtless the same results would be reached in
West Virginia for the courts expressly recognize the fact that the
effect of the trust receipt is to be determined by the statutes and
14Commercial Credit Co. v. Schlegel-Storseth Motor Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 702
(Tex. 1930).
"Commercial Accept. Trust v. Bailey, 87 Cal. App. 117, 261 Pac. 734

(1927).

"'Carrollton Acceptance Co. v. Wharton, 22 S. W. (2d) 985 (Tex. 1930).
See also Hartford Accident & Idemnity Co. v. Callahan, 171 N. E. 820 (Mass.
1930).
17G. M. A. C. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925).
" Houck v. G. M. A. C., 44 F. (2d) 410 (W. D. Pa. 1930).
19Baker v. Bailey Ice Mach, Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36 S. Ct. 50, (1915).
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decisions of the state where the transfer is made, and our statute
on the point is similar to that of Kansas.'
Suppose, however, the dealer has sold the car? A Virginia
case holds that the payment, within the four months period, of the
proceeds of the sale of an auto, covered by a trust receipt, to the
financing agency constitutes an unlawful preference when the
dealer was at the time insolvent and had an intention to prefer the
agency of which the latter had reasonable cause to be aware.' In
such case the holder of the trust receipt has permitted the dealer
to dispose of his security title, and he becomes in exchange a
creditor, thus losing the special rights which he retained as the
holder of a trust receipt.
Although the courts have not been in accord in their classifications of the transaction, they have disregarded the camouflage of
paper title and protected bona-fide purchasers who have relied on
an automobile dealer's apparent ownership to their detriment.
Creditors of such dealers, to be protected, must attach a lien by
legal process, or petition the dealer into bankruptcy. '
-DONALD

M.

HUTTON.

"W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 3, § 9.
2Nusbaum v. City Bank & Trust Co., 132 Va. 54, 110 S. E. 363 (1922).
"THE

FIFTH DRAFT OF A UNIFORm TRuSTS RECEIPTS AcT, 1930, requires

recordation to protect the lender against creditors and purchasers. See Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
1930, p. 272, §§ 6-8, 13-15. For a presentation of the arguments against requiring recordation see Hanna, Trust Receipts (1931) 19 CAL. L. REv. 257.
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